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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the development of the New Left of the 
1960s, represented by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). 
The SDS was founded in 1960 and supported by the Old Leftist League 
for Industrial Democracy (LID) . In 1965 the SDS divorced itself 
from the LID due to ideological and strategic differences in 
reforming American society. The SDS's anti-poverty program, 
Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) served as an active 
expression of Old Left and New Left differences. These differences 
demonstrated by ERAP will receive special attention in this study. 
As a consequence of the separation, the SDS was free to develop and 
revive the American Left. But, its separation from the LID also 
helped cause the SDS's disintegration and downfall in 1968/1969.
REVIVING THE AMERICAN LEFT: ERAP AND THE LID-SDS CONFLICT
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twentieth century, left-wing organizations have 
been part of the American political scene. The degree of influence 
and effect of the Left has varied in accordance to events and major 
political trends. In order to remain politically alive, leftist 
organizations have had to adjust their level of radicalism to the 
current social, economic, and political trends of the era.. The 
League for Industrial Democracy (LID) is a perfect example of a 
leftist group which adapted its political views and strategies to 
the current political mainstream. In the Depression thirties, the 
League was actively involved in advocating socialism in the United 
States. In the conservative and post-New Deal fifties, however, 
the LID called for particularly modest social reforms regarding 
Social Security and health care. By the early 1960s, student 
activists were disillusioned by the watered-down Left. University 
students perceived the postwar Left ineffective in a nation in need 
of fundamental reforms in the areas of poverty, social equality, 
free political debate, and an overarching, yet aloof, federal 
bureaucracy. In order to demand reforms effectively, student 
activists believed that it was necessary to revive the Left.
This "new" Left was largely represented by the LID's student 
organization, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), formed
2
3in 1960. The SDS announced their views in their 1962 manifesto, 
The Port Huron Statement. Besides outlining an agenda for domestic 
and foreign policy reform for the sixties, The Port Huron Statement 
represented the initiation of the revival of the American Left, 
separate from the languid Old Leftist LID. The first actual 
project created solely by the SDS was the Economic Research and 
Action Project (ERAP--"Ee-rap"). Begun in 1963, ERAP acted both as 
a channel by which the SDS could demonstrate its concern for anti- 
poverty and political reform and to serve as an agent by which the 
SDS could Separate itself from the overbearing and ineffective LID. 
Thus, it can be argued that The Port Huron Statement represented 
the SDS's calling for a revived Left, while ERAP made the SDS's 
interests in creating a New Left a physical reality. Such activity 
produced an independent environment which further helped to 
alienate the LID from the SDS, a breach which became permanent by 
1965.
ERAP emphasized the further separation of the SDS from the 
LID and the reactivation of the American Left by designing its 
strategies and approaches to poverty contrary to the principles of 
the LID. The SDS attacked the methods of the LID by advocating an 
activist, rather than an educative, approach to ending poverty; by 
renouncing the state liberalism of the Democratic party; and by 
designing ERAP and its individual chapters to be representative of 
decentralized and participatory democracy.
ERAP's rejection of LID tactics alone did not cause the LID- 
SDS breakup, but it did express differences between the two, making
such a division inevitable. Once the separation did occur, the SDS 
eliminated the influences of " 'old fogeyism' " and the New Left was 
given the potential to flourish and create an identity unto itself. 
But, detachment from the LID, brought freedom for which the SDS was 
not prepared. Without the LID's experience with orthodox Marxist 
organizations and the lack of a definite ideology of its own, the 
SDS attracted an assortment of Leftist groups and people. 
Therefore, organizations greatly different from the Port Huron 
generation of SDSers (e.g., The Progressive Labor Party and 
extreme radical elements which would form the Revolutionary Youth 
Movement and the Weathermen) infiltrated the SDS and helped cause 
its disintegration in 1968-1969.
In order to formulate the argument that the SDS used ERAP to 
express itself as an organization strategically and ideologically 
different from the postwar LID (Old Left) , it is necessary first to 
present backgrounds of the LID and the SDS up to The Port Huron 
Statement and the ensuing LID-SDS confrontation. Following the 
1962 conflict, the history of ERAP will be presented and its anti- 
Old Left elements analyzed. Finally, the thesis will conclude with 
immediate and long-term implications of my interpretation of ERAP 
as an agent which helped the New Left divorce itself from the Old 
Left.
CHAPTER I
SDS-LID RELATIONS BEFORE ERAP
Immediately after the SDS was created in I960, it was at odds 
with its parent organization, the League for Industrial Democracy. 
The LID rebuked the SDS for its mailing list practices in 1960 and 
for The Port Huron Statement in 1962. Although differences 
remained between the two, the LID sponsored the SDS until 1965 when 
ideological and strategic differences became so deep that a 
relationship was no longer feasible. Such differences first became 
visibly evident by the goals and tactics of the Economic Research 
and Action Project. In order to understand the rift between the 
two left-wing organizations of the early 1960s, backgrounds and 
definitions of the LID and the SDS are necessary.
When the LID was organized in 1905, by socialists Harry 
Laidler, Upton Sinclair, and Jack London, the League was known 
as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS). (1) The ISS 
concentrated its efforts on educating the American public about a 
social order based on production use, rather than on profits. The 
ISS worked to achieve its pedagogic goal by sponsoring study 
groups, research bureaus, socialist speakers on college campuses, 
and by publishing essays and reports by its members. (2) After the 
ISS changed to the League for Industrial Democracy in 1921, the
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6organization adopted an active role in American politics and 
society. For example, the LID participated in the 
LaFollette-Wheeler Progressive party presidential campaign in 
1924. (3)
In the 1930s, the work and popularity of the LID increased as 
the League continued actively to advocate social change. During 
the Depression, the LID organized southern textile workers in North 
Carolina. By taking jobs in the mills, the LID directly unionized 
the textile workers. (4) The LID also engaged in the areas of civil 
liberties and civil rights. The organization provided legal aid to 
Angelo Herndon (arrested in Alabama for distributing Communist 
literature) and the Scottsboro Boys.(5)
Also in the 1930s, the student wing of the LID was formed. 
The Intercollegiate LID was created in 1932 as an autonomous 
appendage of the LID and became the Student League for Industrial 
Democracy (SLID) in 1934. During the Depression, the SLID 
activities involved relief work, operating soup kitchens for 
unemployed workers and striking miners and their families. As 
World War II intensified, the SLID protested campus ROTC and 
impending direct American military involvement. (6) After the War, 
the SLID opposed segregation, the postwar draft, and American 
foreign policy favoring undemocratic governments. The SLID 
championed reforms such as the expansion of Social Security, 
universal health insurance, and cooperative housing. The SLID 
also joined the LID in supporting the hardline liberal presidential 
candidate Henry Wallace in 1948.(7)
7The LID's postwar history was similar to that of the SLID. 
During the general postwar prosperity of the fifties, the LID's 
views shifted closer to the center of the political spectrum. 
Instead of calling for anti-Stalinist/anti-totalitarian socialism, 
the League favored a political system resembling that of a liberal 
capitalist state. Throughout the 1950s, the LID demanded 
legislation on land conservation, public ownership of utilities, 
national health insurance, public housing, national aid for 
education, and migrant worker protection.(8)
A pamphlet written by Norman Thomas and published by the LID 
in 1953, "Democratic Socialism: A New Appraisal, " represented the
new liberal approach. In his essay, Thomas advocated national 
health care, Social Security?expansion, and a progressive tax 
policy.(9) Thomas claimed that the current federal American 
political system should be relied upon to institute these 
and other social reforms; the progressivism of Franklin Roosevelt 
and the Supreme Court -had put the United States in the direction 
toward a socialist society, attainable by piecemeal reforms.(10) 
In order to keep the U.S. on this road to socialism, democratic 
socialists, according to Thomas, should capture the liberal wing of 
the Democratic party. Thomas indicated that Democratic 
conservatives had impeded the party's progressive stance and 
presented fellow Democrats and the American people with "no other 
inspiration than warmed over New Dealism".(11) Thomas 
specifically declared in his essay that it was possible to 
resurrect progressivism in the Democratic party by educating
8Democrats and American citizens of socialism. Finally, Thomas 
proclaimed that "the working class is not the Messiah which some of 
us thought". Democratic socialism should no longer rely on 
the "masses," but on the existing "constitutional processes" to 
achieve a socialist society in the United States.(12) Michael 
Harrington, organizer of the Young Peoples Socialist League (YPSL- 
the youth organization of the anti-stalinist socialist 
Schachtmanites), heeded Thomas's call and focused his political 
strategies on burrowing into the Democratic party in order to 
move it to the left of liberalism.(131
When the SDS was founded in 1960, the LID was still attracted 
to liberalism as the middle road to socialism. The League called 
for ending religious and racial discrimination, making political 
institutions more accessible to the general public, and improving 
and increasing Social Security and unemployment compensation. The 
LID also favored increased regulation of monopolies and aid to 
underdeveloped countries. And by the early 1960s, the LID focused 
much attention on the effects of automation. The debate on 
automation, spurred by the new technology gained by World War Two, 
obsessed the liberal, left, and labor wings of American politics 
throughout the 1960s. (14)
After World War II, the LID returned to its original 
educative approach, suggested by its original name, the ISS. By 
no longer publicly protesting American foreign policy (the LID was 
strongly anti-communist by the 1950s) and supporting third party 
presidential candidates--following Henry Wallace's 1948 campaign--
9the LID had moved to the margin of mainstream American politics. 
This change in strategy may have been a result of the 
progressivism of the thirties and forties which co-opted the 
radicalism of the LID. The softer approach might also have 
been propagated in order to prevent their being identified with 
revolutionary Soviet communism. No matter what reason for the 
watered-down Left, the LID and its SLID were weak and paralyzed 
organizations. The apparent stagnation of the LID and the SLID is 
what inspired SLID member Robert (Al) Haber to revive the SLID and 
transform it into the SDS.
In 1959, Al Haber, a graduate student at the University of 
Michigan at Ann Arbor, planned the revival of the SLID as an active 
student political organization. In 1960, Haber perceived the 
expanding civil rights movement as an opportunity to attract 
northern students to a strong multi-issue organization. In order 
to gain attention of what would be the SDS and to express support 
for blacks staging student sit-ins in the South, Haber and 
fellow students Robert Ross, Sharon Jeffrey, and later Tom Hayden, 
picketed in front of Kresge dimestores at the University of 
Michigan in May 1960.(15)
From 1960 to 1962, the SDS continued to concentrate solely in 
the area of civil rights--the most popular movement at the time. 
The SDS advocated desegregation and equal rights for blacks in the 
South by combining its resources with the radical student wing of 
the civil rights movement, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC--"Snick"). SNCC believed that social change could
10
be brought about only by directly confronting legislators and those 
in charge of implementing repressive policies of discrimination and 
segregation. By participating with SNCC, the SDS learned first­
hand the strategy of direct action and speculated that the tactic 
used to confront an immutable structure could be applied to other 
social issues.(16)
Hostilities between the SDS and the LID began in March 1961. 
Haber was fired as president of the SDS by the LID for proposing 
that the SDS become an active, rather than an educative, 
organization by planning to send out a civil rights newsletter to 
10,000 students. The LID was first concerned with the SDS becoming 
a mass organization for a variety of students who might not be 
sympathetic to the LID's basic liberal and moderate principles.(17) 
The LID also believed that if the SDS were to become an active 
organization, the LID would likely lose its tax-exempt status as an 
educational organization.(18)
Through the intercession of Norman Thomas and Haber's father, 
LID member William Haber, Al Haber was reinstated as president in 
May 1961. Thomas criticized the LID'S paranoia of an active 
student left and Haber's father reminded the League of the 
importance of his son's idealistic youthfulness and sense of social 
responsibility.(19)
A paper by Al Haber written shortly after he was allowed to 
return to the SDS called for more independence from the parent 
organization. Haber specifically recommended that the SDS have 
direct control over the election of the SDS staff and that the SDS
11
have more freedom in its fundraising and financial affairs. 
Overall, Haber urged that the LID be only a consultant to the SDS 
and not be responsible for the SDS's activities.(20) Perhaps, 
under these circumstances, the LID and SDS could be affiliated 
without jeopardizing the LID's tax-exempt status. Regardless of 
Haber's memorandum to the LID, the League continued direct control 
over the SDS's activities, cautioning Haber from promoting and 
organizing the SDS as a politically active group.
It was within this tense situation between the LID and the SDS 
that the SDS drafted its first major policy manifesto. The Port 
Huron Statement in 1962. The manifesto was influenced by the SDS's 
speculation that it could shift the tactic of direct action used
for civil rights to other issues if the SDS expanded its
perspective. The Port Huron Statement thus expressed a multitude 
of concerns of middle-class students and urged apathetic students 
to confront issues such as civil rights, anticommunism, foreign 
policy, social welfare, and America's "power elite."
One recommendation the SDS made in The Port Huron Statement 
was that a full-scale civil rights program be implemented by the 
federal government. The SDS also urged the government to publicly 
denounce racism, support desegregation legislation, and use 
the power of the executive office to persuade morally the American 
people as well as the "Dixiecrats" to end all forms of 
discrimination.(21) The SDS perceived that the pressure of the
"Dixiecrats" had forced the Democratic party to lose its
progressive identity. According to the SDS, the southern
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conservative Democrats had prevented many social reforms such as 
civil rights. By purging the party of Dixiecrats, the Democratic 
party (the majority party in Congress) could approve a strong civil 
rights platform and guarantee its passage in Congress.(22)
The Port Huron Statement also called for more active popular 
participation in national politics.. The SDS criticized the current 
American system which favored business and industry lobbies 
representing only a small fraction of the population. The 
manifesto suggested organizing specific interest groups to act as 
educative and politicizing: agents for the common citizens. Such 
organizations could then act as channels for those not associated 
with a major lobby to articulate their needs and demands to the 
federal government.(23)
The SDS claimed that common people possessed with a strong 
voice to articulate their interests could successfully demand and 
achieve sweeping social reforms. The SDS indicated that reforms 
were needed most in the areas of education, the penal system, 
mental health, and poverty. The SDS demanded a comprehensive 
economic program which would attack structural problems related to 
the causes of poverty. The SDS recommended immediate anti-poverty 
reforms in the areas of housing, medical aid, Social Security, and 
minimum wage.(24) The science community was also called on to 
concentrate more on improving social welfare and health 
rather than on defense. The SDS criticized the government for 
funding the development of new weapons to confront the perceived 
military threat of the Soviet Union instead of supporting
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scientific research on health care.(25)
The imbalanced stress placed on defense research coupled with 
inordinate military spending was unnecessary because the U.S.S.R., 
according to the SDS, had not been proven an expansionist and 
threatening power. Another result of America's misperception of 
the Soviet foreign policy was that the United States often 
militarily aided and defended post-colonial countries in order to 
prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere. The SDS recommended 
that the United States aid the economic development of post- 
colonial nations through international agencies like the United 
Nations rather than supply them with guns.(26)
Although the SDS stated clearly in its manifesto that it 
opposed communism (mainly because of its domestic policy of 
suppressing human rights), the SDS also opposed McCarthyism. The 
fear of Soviet expansion had encouraged a wave of anticommunism 
which threatened basic American freedoms. The "exaggerated" 
communist threat restricted debate and forced citizens to accept a 
conforming political doctrine designed to defend itself against a 
so-called "demonic" enemy. McCarthyism had prevented any serious 
analysis and approach to U.S.-Soviet relations because it 
contradicted the basic requirement of democracy, permission of 
peaceful and loyal opposition.(27)
The Port Huron Statement also criticized the universities for 
failing to facilitate social change. Universities had defined 
as their purpose to prepare students to "get by" and to fit into 
the general society. Universities were further hampered from
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acting as agents of social change by the imposing academic 
bureaucracy. The SDS stated that the university bureaucracy had 
created a sense of powerlessness which conditioned students 
to be indifferent and numb to society's problems and political 
structure. Yet, because of their access to knowledge and 
tolerance of various opinions, The Port Huron Statement claimed 
that universities had great potential in engineering and conducting 
a mass social movement. (28)
By its exhibition and criticism of America's social and 
political shortcomings, The Port Huron Statement and the SDS had 
made the point that the American Left needed to be revived. This 
"New" Left was to take on the role of immediately advocating the 
overarching social and political reforms outlined in the manifesto. 
The Old Left (the LID), however, did not embrace The Port Huron 
Statement; in fact the League strongly opposed it.
In a secret Executive Committee session in early July 1962, 
the LID accused the convention of being "unrepresentative" of the 
LID and of operating outside the authority of the parent 
organization and suspended the SDS's activities. The SDS was 
indefinitely, restrained from mailing or publishing their 
literature and the LID refused to pay for materials pertaining to 
the SDS's policies and political positions. The LID subsequently 
summoned Al Haber and Tom Hayden, the main authors of The Port 
Huron Statement, to a hearing before the LID executive committee on 
July 6. (29)
The first accusation at the hearing was introduced by
15
committee member Harrington who charged the SDS with "united 
frontism,1 the association with other Left organizations other than 
the LID.(30) The "united frontism" that Harrington referred to 
was demonstrated by the presence of a member of the Progressive 
Youth Organizing Committee (PYOC) , the youth wing of the Communist 
party, at the June 1962 convention.(31)
"United frontism," according to Harrington, was threatening 
because of its damaging results in the past. The SLID experienced 
"united frontism" when it amalgamated with the Communist party's 
National Student League (NSL) in 1935, forming the American Student 
Union (ASU). Even though the socialists and communists found their 
ideologies different from each other, the two groups felt it was 
necessary to unite in order to provide a more significant voice 
against American intervention in World War II. After the two 
organizations merged to form the ASU, however, the Communists 
continued to attack publicly and directly the ideas of the 
Socialists. After the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939 and the Soviet 
invasion of Finland in 1940, the SLID faction of the ASU became 
deeply disenchanted with their communist counterparts and left the 
ASU. Afterward, however, the SLID found itself in disarray.(32) 
The presence of the member of the PYOC at the drafting of The 
Port Huron Statement, however, was hardly a threat to the 
organization and political strategy of the SDS. The PYOC member in 
question, Jim Hawley, was only seventeen and not even a card- 
carrying member of the Communist party.(33) The SDS granted 
Hawley only observer status and he did not verbally participate.
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The SDS also felt that by not admitting Hawley into the convention, 
the SDS would be betraying its own principles of working toward a 
more open society which would encourage a variety of opinions and 
allow peaceful opposition.(34)
Furthermore, it is possible that the SDS believed that they 
were adhering to the advice of the LID regarding relations with 
non-SDS members. In a May 16-17, 1960 policy paper entitled "SDS 
Statement of Goals," the SDS claimed that LID members Harrington 
and Cy Landy suggested that the SDS "take under its wing" 
autonomous "political clubs." Landy and Harrington believed that 
the presence of other leftist organizations would facilitate a 
wider view of politics and social needs. Landy and Harrington 
did not restrict any specific organizations, but did mention the 
YPSL (of which Harrington was a senior member) as a possible group 
which the SDS should approach.(35) Thus, such a nebulous stance 
by the LID may have been perceived by the SDS as an indirect 
allowance of (or at least indifference toward) association with 
orthodox Communists.
The SDS did not fear a relationship with the Communists or 
Communist infiltration because they were perceived as strict 
adherents to an immutable authoritarian doctrine which had nothing 
to do with participatory democracy or direct action. The SDS could 
not understand why the Communists would be interested in an 
organization possessing a different ideology.(36)
Still, Tom Kahn of the Youth Progressive Socialist League, 
also affiliated with the LID, was concerned that the SDS's loose
17
connection with the LID, its absence of a clearly defined ideology, 
and inexperience in dealing with Communists would encourage the 
Communist party or a front organization to penetrate and subvert 
the SDS. (37) The LID was also concerned that the SDS might appear 
communistic because of their relatively neutral stand on communism 
in The Port Huron Statement. Although the SDS stated that they 
despised the communist single-party state and its high degree of 
top-down, state centralization, their stance was obscured by the 
SDS's implication that the United States was the ultimate party at 
fault in perpetuating the Cold War and by their claim that the 
Soviet Union was not necessarily pursuing a policy of 
expansion.(38)
The LID was inherently anticommunist since its origins in the 
early 1900s. The LID continued its anticommunism after World 
War II and became more outspoken on the issue. This may have been 
due to the LID's own antitotalitarian ideology, but it is also 
likely that the liberal organization feared being branded communist 
in the McCarthyist fifties. The interest of the LID to present 
itself as a non-communist organization inadvertently caused the SDS 
to view the LID and its positions similar to its red baiting 
adversaries in the 1950s.
After the LID hearing on July 6, the committee (Vera Rony, 
Richard Roman, Harry Fleischman, Emanuel Muravchak, and Harrington) 
voted to allow the SDS to approve its manifesto, but deferred 
the salaries of Haber (field secretary) and Hayden (president). 
The LID now required that it issue final approval of all documents
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the SDS published.(39) To further assert control over the SDS's 
activities, the LID appointed a secretary responsible to the LID to 
oversee daily operations of the SDS central office in New York 
City. The LID did not mention to Haber and Hayden that the LID 
had also confiscated the SDS's mailing lists and changed the lock 
on the SDS office door.(40) Haber and Hayden appealed to the LID 
on July 12 and were given back their office and severance pay was 
considered. But, the LID appointed secretary remained.(41)
The LID-SDS confrontation had revealed to Haber and Hayden 
that the LID expected the SDS to serve as a student operated . 
duplicate of the parent organization. (42) They believed that such 
a relationship was undesirable because the SDS (especially Hayden) 
concluded that the LID had become ineffective in confronting 
current social problems. The LID emphasized education, while the 
SDS wanted to act. Apparently the LID had adhered too closely to 
its objective printed on the cover page of the LID pamphlets after 
World War II: "Education for,increasing democracy in our economic,
political, and cultural life."(43)
According to Hayden's appeal to the LID's lockout, the LID and 
the SDS had entered into a relationship which had destroyed all 
autonomy of the SDS.(44) The confrontation with the LID 
demonstrated to Haber and Hayden the LID's tight and arbitrary 
control over the SDS. By curbing the SDS's independence, the LID 
appeared as repressive as the society which the students were 
attempting to change. Furthermore, the SDS perceived the LID's 
control as inhibiting the freedom of the SDS which was necessary to
19
revive the American Left.
Although they resented the LID's approach to social reform and 
their direct control over their organization, the SDS wished to 
remain affiliated with the League. The student organization 
believed that the experience and knowledge of the LID members would 
be helpful to the progress of their own work. The SDS felt that 
opposing ideas should be encouraged because such discussion would 
yield the impression that change was taking place and that the Left 
was once again active.(45)
Yet, the SDS implied that a separation between the two would 
be most desirable. By abandoning its direct relationship with the 
LID, the SDS would have the maximum freedom to explore its own 
solutions to social and political problems. Hayden stated in his 
appeal to the LID, "We do not choose to discuss the problems of our 
era in the pre-ordained language of our fathers."(46)
There were two Old Lefts. The one prior to World War II was 
active and aggressively advocated immediate radical socialist 
reforms. The Old Left of the fifties was an ineffective 
organization which pursued moderate and single-issue reforms 
which were also conveniently supported by liberal elements of the 
Democratic party. This postwar Left was rejected by the New Left 
of the early sixties in favor of the Left similar to that of the 
thirties. Tensions between the New Left and Old Left first became 
obvious during the 1962 conflict between the SDS and the LID. The 
New Left was disaffected by the left of postwar era which, 
according to the SDS, had been co-opted by the Establishment
and neutralized. The struggle between the elements of the New Left 
and Old Left shaped and influenced the development of the SDS by 
the SDS's rejection of certain ideas and strategies of the LID. 
The spurning of ideas of the postwar Old Left would especially 
become apparent in the goals and strategies of the SDS1s 
Economic Research and Action Project.
CHAPTER II
THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND ACTION PROJECT
One of the first activities of consequence of the SDS was the 
Economic Research and Action Project, ostensibly created in 
response to the "discovery" of poverty in the late fifties and 
early sixties. The overall strategy of ERAP was to have college 
students live among and politically organize the poor in northern 
cities in order to demand aid and fundamental social reforms from 
the federal government. The SDS supported this ambitious project 
from 1963 to 1965. From 1965 through 1967, ERAP chapters operated 
independently from the SDS. Throughout its four year history, ERAP 
gradually departed from its original purposes, strategies, and 
goals. ERAP evolved from a project based on enacting social reform 
through education and research to a program which emphasized direct 
action and experimentation with participatory democracy. The 
changes in the ERAP program demonstrate also the rejection of the 
principles and tactics of the Old Left represented by the LID.
The idea of initiating an anti-poverty project originated 
at the June 7-30, 1963, National Convention at Pine Hill, New York. 
At this meeting, the SDS drafted America and the New Era. Its 
second statement defined SDS's mission more closely and discussed 
the problem of poverty and liberalism's futile attempts in dealing
21
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with it. According to the document, token governmental reforms, 
such as Kennedy's Area Redevelopment Act, failed to produce 
radical, fundamental changes capable of improving American economic 
and social structures. State liberalism had abandoned its populist 
and progressive platform and now favored the elite and private 
industry. Liberalism had sacrificed genuine reforms for its self- 
interest in preserving the current system. America and the New 
Era, therefore, called for a formal rejection of alliances with the 
liberal establishment and a re-creation of a popular Leftist 
opposition which would prevent itself from being co-opted by the 
elite. (1) The opposition to the government's liberal welfare and 
social domestic policies, loosely described in the SDS's 1963 
statement, formed the basis of the Economic Research and Action 
Project.
America and the New Era suggested a community based program 
to organize the poor in slums, intended especially to reach 
underprivileged and unemployed youth. The program would also 
conduct analysis on community economic conditions. From such 
analysis, a political approach would be devised by the community 
itself. Only by a system of participatory democracy could basic 
social, political, and economic reforms be attained.(2)
The foundation for a community based economic project was laid 
at the SDS 1963 National Council Meeting in Bloomington, Indiana, 
two days after the August 28 "March on Washington for Jobs and 
Freedom." At the August 30 to September 1 meeting, the SDS 
announced that the United Auto Workers had presented the students
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with $5,000 for one year and access to UAW publication facilities. 
The grant was intended to help initiate a program to study and 
accentuate economic problems in American cities--a goal similar to 
the program described in America and the New Era. The UAW also 
expected the project to raise poverty issues on campuses and build 
a strong relationship between students and adult labor unions which 
had been negatively associated with big business by the SDS.(3)
In order to apply.the funding to its intended purpose, Tom 
Hayden, 1963 SDS president, organized the Economic Research and 
Action Project, headed by Al Haber. Haber opened ERAP's main 
office at the University of Michigan and, in fall 1963, University 
of Michigan sophomore Joe Chabot was sent to Chicago to initiate 
ERAP's first chapter. Chabot's work focused on organizing 
unemployed white youths, however, Chabot found Chicago youths 
uninterested in a community action program. Still, Chabot opened 
a JOIN (Jobs or Income Now) office four doors away from the 
Uptown unemployment office where Chabot and fellow SDSer 
Steve Max handed out leaflets listing available social and legal 
services.(4)
That same fall, the Student Political Action Committee 
(SPAC) at Swarthmore College also worked on organizing the 
poor, although SPAC was at that time unaffiliated with ERAP. SPAC 
joined with the NAACP sponsored Committee For Freedom Now (CFFN) in 
mobilizing residents of Chester, Pennsylvania to protest against 
overcrowded and dilapidated Franklin Elementary School. According 
to the February 1964 ERAP Newsletter, when the school was built in
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1912, it was designed for 500 students. However, in 1963, the same 
building held 1100 pupils and was in a state of disrepair. In 
November 1963, a boycott of the school was organized in which 400 
students participated. SPACers, students from Bryn Mawr College, 
the CFFN, and residents staged three days of demonstrations which 
included blocking the school's entrance and seizing Chester's city 
hall, resulting in the arrests of 241 people. Still, the school 
board and city officials did agree to repair facilities at Franklin 
Elementary and to transport the overflow of students to other 
schools. The school board also made plans for the gradual closing 
of the school. The CFFN, headed by Stanley Branche, executive 
secretary of the Chester NAACP, remained organized in order to 
campaign for other public needs such as adequate medical care, full 
employment, and renovated low-cost housing.(5)
From September to December 1963, ERAP had no overall 
definitive strategy in dealing with the poor and unemployed. 
Instead, it attempted to create a plan by experimenting directly 
with community action movements. Still, Haber, attempted to 
outline ERAP's goals and strategy in Ann Arbor. Haber 
conceptualized ERAP as a program which should focus mainly on 
mobilizing university students rather than on the ghettoes.(6) 
Haber wanted ERAP to provide a speaker service and to sponsor 
conferences on poverty to educate students who would then support 
anti-poverty causes. He also planned to have ERAP work with civil 
rights and peace organizations by supplying them with information 
obtained by ERAP's research.(7) As an action project, Haber
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recommended that ERAP develop a strong alliance between radicals 
and progressive labor unions and to organize (but not participate 
in) projects favoring higher minimum wage laws, job training, and 
rent strikes. ERAP would also sponsor programs for student welfare 
on campuses, such as student tenant unions.(8)
By basing its operations at universities and making its 
presence known to campuses, ERAP would be in a favorable position 
to act as an agent for radicalizing students and making them more 
socially conscious. By doing so, ERAP would create what Haber 
called "radical professionals" who would continue their work in 
reform after they graduated.(9) Haber's radical vision of the 
direction of the American "Left" truly made it "new" and distinct 
from the Old Left.
ERAP was reassessed at the December 27-31, 1963 National 
Conference in New York. There it was revealed that not everyone 
shared Haber's opinion that ERAP should operate mainly on campuses. 
Hayden and Todd Gitlin, SDS president from 1963 to 1964, argued 
that ERAP should take on a strong active role in the society at 
large, similar to the work of Joe Chabot in Uptown Chicago.(10)
As expected, Haber presented the argument that ERAP should be used 
to create radical professionals by concentrating on social 
research, writing on poverty, and formulating strategies for non­
students. Hayden's vision of ERAP resembled that of the work of 
SNCC, in which SNCC workers lived among poor blacks in "freedom 
houses" in the South. Hayden (an ex-SNCC worker) suggested that 
students live among the poor in the North. His emphasis on direct
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action over intellectualism was also caused by the urgency of the 
plight of the poor in the early 1960s. Hayden claimed that 
students could be more successful in not only research, but also by 
improving the condition of the poor by working and living with 
them. (11) Hayden's argument and pessimistic view of the university 
as an unlikely agent for social activism was actually a direct 
expression of the SDS's opinion that the university system was 
incapable of facilitating reform.
The December conference voted to approve the ERAP program of 
living among and actively mobilizing the poor. The rejection of 
Haber's position was advanced by the election of Rennie Davis as 
ERAP's head. (12) In the upcoming summer of 1964, the SDS planned 
to locate projects in northern cities which would form grass-roots 
models of participatory democracy to articulate economic and 
political needs from the federal government.
To launch the new direct approach of ERAP, Tom Hayden and Carl 
Wittman drafted "An Interracial Movement of the Poor?" in early 
1964. Wittman, a student at Swarthmore College, had led the ERAP- 
type program in Chester, fall 1963. Wittman and Hayden based 
their essay on a tactic suggested by Michael Harrington in The 
Other America (1962) . Harrington (as well as Wittman and Hayden) 
declared that economic changes would most likely occur if northern 
poor urban blacks and whites were mobilized into an integrated 
union. It was expected that an organized union of whites and 
blacks would create a strong political voice to force a 
comprehensive national anti-poverty program beneficent to all
27
races.(13)
Harrington argued that poor whites would not be inhibited by 
their prejudices once they realized they confronted the same enemy 
of blacks, the American economic system. Poor, unskilled, white 
laborers, antagonistic toward blacks, were under the impression 
that civil rights victories and equal opportunity meant that blacks 
would take jobs traditionally reserved for whites. These lower- 
class whites needed to understand that minorities did not threaten 
their jobs as much as the rising tide of automation. (14) Wittman 
and Hayden expanded the interracial concept by considering problems 
such a union might encounter and by offering concrete organizing 
plans.
Aware that poor whites with racist attitudes might find union 
with blacks difficult, Hayden and Wittman recommended that ERAP 
volunteers organize programs in neighborhoods encouraging common 
economic identification between members of the two races. Hayden 
and Wittman claimed that if poor whites and blacks worked together 
in community programs race would be seen as a diversionary issue 
which distracted the poor from the actual economic issues.(15)
Another potential obstacle concerning an interracial movement 
and a community based anti-poverty union was the lack of leadership 
available among the poor. ERAP hoped that by eliciting leadership 
qualities from select members at ERAP's community union meetings, 
leaders of a movement would emerge. Leadership could be invoked by 
holding meetings with the poor to discuss their condition and to 
instruct them on articulating their needs and interests. Hayden
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and Wittman noted in their essay that such community unions were 
mainly supposed to serve as a means to exert pressure nationally 
and not to be ends in themselves.(16) ERAP intended community 
unions to practice experimental participatory democracy enabling 
the poor with a strong political voice. The practice of 
participatory democracy would then form the foundation for changing 
the American political structure. Participatory democracy would be 
validated by the moral and social goals it would achieve.(17)
ERAP volunteers would initiate their participatory democratic 
program by knocking on doors of apartments and houses and recording 
the needs and concerns of neighborhood residents and by informing 
tenants of the weekly ERAP neighborhood meeting. (18) The community 
union meetings, initially conducted by the students, disregarded 
formal rules of order and decided on programs and policy positions 
by consensus. The intention was to create leadership that would 
eventually enable residents to organize and run a popular local
democracy themselves. The Chicago JOIN project shifted its.
authority to the poor almost completely by fall 1965. Not only was 
a local resident made chairman of JOIN, but the community union, 
according to JOIN, now practiced participatory democracy.(19)
JOIN'S concept of participatory democracy in 1965 did not mean 
that each person had one vote. People's interests were represented 
by each individual's direct material interest at stake on each 
issue; if a resident's interests were not directly threatened, his 
vote and opinion would be less influential than that of a resident 
whose concerns were more closely related to the issue in
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question.(20) It might be argued that JOIN favored an interest- 
group democracy similar to that which they opposed at large by 
granting a larger proportion of representation to those with higher 
assets in order to prevent residents who had no interests at stake 
from controlling the debate and the program. But this interest- 
favoring practice of democracy was still different from the system 
criticized in the Port Huron Statement, since it was on a local 
scale, because there was not a wide gap in incomes which would 
necessarily cause one individual to dominate the organization, and 
because it was understood by the members that the purpose of 
community union was to practice a fair democratic system and 
improve the welfare of the residents at large rather than that of 
a single individual. It should also be remembered that overall 
assets were not considered when determining one's interest in an 
issue, rather the level of assets immediately in question on a 
particular issue. Another alteration in 1965 was that chairmen 
were elected for one month, giving all members the opportunity for 
leadership experience. Furthermore, the policies of the organizing 
committee, comprised of those who were actively involved, had to be 
agreed on by the non-active attenders at the meeting. This policy 
helped to expand community involvement.(21)
SDSer Steve Max's May 1964 essay, "Words, Butter, No Parsnips: 
Remarks on the Nature of community Organizing," provided organizers 
with a more precise strategy and purpose of ERAP. In the short 
term, community unions were to confront immediate sources of 
exploitation, mainly slumlords. To do so, Max suggested community
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unions organize rent strikes and picket apartment buildings and 
landlord offices. By working together in non-political struggles 
to achieve a specific goal, a politicized union would be created. 
Max predicted that once the community union had been politicized, 
it would attack more remote sources of exploitation by the local 
and federal government. The expectation was that the politicized 
community union which had created a prefigurative government would 
replace the power of local and federal authorities.(22) ERAP 
chapters often disagreed on the degree of emphasis to place on non­
political short-term goals and long-term national political goals, 
leaving either of these approaches open for adoption by the various 
ERAP chapters in the first summer of ERAP in 1964.
When it developed onto a national scale in 1964, ERAP had 150 
student members and chapters in Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Newark, Chester, and Hazard 
(Appalachian Kentucky). In the course of its four-year 
history, it also claimed chapters in Roxbury (Massachusetts), New 
Brunswick and Hudson County (New Jersey), San Francisco, Cairo 
(Illinois), Cedar Hills (Maryland) and Knoxville, Tennessee.(23) 
ERAP chapters adopted either the JOIN approach and organized 
neighborhoods around fundamental economic problems or formed 
community unions which confronted immediate issues like housing and 
traffic safety.
In 1964, JOIN stressed national problems of unemployment, 
foreign competition, and automation.(24) To express its national 
perspective, JOIN accentuated the crisis of poverty by selling
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apples (a popular image of the Depression) in downtown Chicago and 
at a Pete Seeger concert. JOIN hoped to remind people that a 
national and widespread "Great Depression" existed for millions of 
Americans. Apple selling as well as handing out leaflets on 
current economic problems at the nearby unemployment office, gained 
press attention and attracted people interested in community action 
which President Johnson had called for in his public announcement 
of the War on Poverty early in 1964.(25)
By the end of summer 1964, the unemployment rate began to 
fall, making it difficult to exploit the jobs issue to rally the 
poor. Therefore, the tactics of the Chicago project went the way 
of the Newark Community Union Project (NCUP--"En-Cup) and began 
organizing the poor around immediate local issues regarding health 
care, recreation, schools, and housing. To represent this shift in 
objectives, JOIN opened a second office in Chicago's heavily 
dilapidated Southside.(26) Rennie Davis suggested that JOIN adopt 
the strategy which he would later advocate in his 1965 essay, "The 
War on Poverty: Notes on an Insurgent Response." Davis
recommended that JOIN practice de facto activism.^ For example, 
JOIN should repair a street and present the bill to Mayor Daley or 
repair an apartment and withhold rent until the landlord reimbursed 
tenants for materials and labor.(27)
The Chicago project never became as radical as Davis had 
hoped. Yet, the ERAP Newsletter reported it conducted rent 
strikes and petitioned for a day care center.(28) In June 1965, 
fifteen JOIN members picketed a Chicago welfare office over the
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missed payments of Dorothy Peress. The office realized its error, 
but refused to grant full retroactive payments to Peress. Three 
students and Peress consequently staged a sit-in at the office and 
were arrested.(29)
JOIN also picketed the Urban Progress Center to protest Mayor 
Daley's Commission to administer War on Poverty funds because it 
had no representation of the poor.(30) This action was 
particularly important because "urban renewal" was being considered 
for the Uptown neighborhood. JOIN supported "urban renewal if it 
meant better housing and jobs for those already living in the 
community, but such a successful "urban renewal" was unlikely 
without representation of local residents. It was more than likely 
that the area would be renovated to suit the needs of upper-income 
citizens.(31) Thus, despite JOIN1s efforts, "urban renewal" plans 
proceeded in Chicago's Uptown.
NCUP did not evolve or decline from a national to local 
interest organization like JOIN. NCUP began and ended its focus on 
short-term local goals. As with JOIN, NCUP began by opening up a 
store-front office from which it handed out leaflets announcing 
meetings, demonstrations, lists of tenant rights, and places for 
legal assistance.(32) However, NCUP's programs to empower local 
neighborhoods were intended to build a movement which would work 
for immediate results, rather than for national reforms.
A local issue NCUP dealt with was the brutal treatment by the 
police of the Clinton Hill neighborhood where NCUP was based. In 
summer 1964, The Hunterdon Block Club, organized by NCUP, arranged
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a picketing of one hundred people at the local police station. In 
winter 1965, sixteen residents picketed a "Klein's" department 
store after it was reported to ERAP that a store detective beat 
Clyde Wright, accused of shoplifting.(33)
NCUP1 s most popular movement on a local scale was to have the 
city erect a traffic light at an intersection in Clinton Hill. 
According to Tom Hayden, one of NCUP's leaders, the traffic light 
issue was a symbol of other problems of the city.(34) By 
galvanizing residents around a definitive and immediate issue, NCUP 
hoped.the neighborhood would undergo radicalization necessary .to 
confront more difficult and abstract goals such as local 
representation on area poverty boards and increased national anti- 
poverty funding. Hayden recalled in his autobiography that the day 
after a protest of which 200 people participated, ten NCUP members, 
comprised of nine local residents and Hayden, were invited to meet 
with Deputy Mayor Paul Reilly. Reilly told the group that a survey 
and study would have to be initiated before a permanent traffic 
light could be installed. Two days later, John Barnes, a 
representative of the Newark machine councilman Irvine Turner, 
notified Hayden and a Clinton Hill resident that the light would be 
erected.(35)
As a result of protests organized by NCUP, Hayden claimed that 
local residents began to feel a sense of political power. If this 
was the case, NCUP successfully achieved its goal of creating "a 
group of people with no previous political connections . . .  to 
speak and act without being embarrassed or dependent on the higher
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ups. 1 (36) The SDS believed that protests regarding police 
brutality and traffic safety developed a ^ public capable of directly 
voicing their needs and representing themselves. According to 
Hayden, NCUP encouraged its block organizations to attend local 
area poverty board meetings where they successfully expressed their 
needs such as a communitytbased service center. At the center, 
attorneys would be available to tenants who could represent them 
against corrupt landlords. (37) Still, the best way for the poor to 
articulate their needs was by electing local representatives to 
area poverty boards.
NCUP helped facilitate local representation by passing a 
motion at an area poverty board meeting in Clinton Hill requiring 
board members to be poor themselves. NCUP consequently elected a 
slate of its members to the board by a two-thirds majority in June 
1965 which brought Clinton Hill such accomplishments as the 
aforementioned service center. NCUP's greatest representation 
achievement was in fall 1965 when resident Bessie Smith was elected 
as a city wide trustee of Newark's anti-poverty program.(38)
Despite its marginal successes, NCUP, as well as JOIN, did not 
achieve its goal of an interracial movement. This was mainly 
because the chapters were located in segregated areas of cities. 
Research by the SDS before the Newark project inaccurately revealed 
that Clinton Hill was 65% black, 10% Puerto Rican, and 25% white 
(East European) . (39) ERAP discovered after moving into poor areas 
that an overwhelming majority of chapters were in black 
neighborhoods. But, even in more racially mixed sections like
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Chicago's Uptown where Puerto Ricans and whites from depressed 
Appalachia co-existed, unity was thwarted by ethnic and racial 
groups who often blamed each other for their economic problems.
According to Casey Hayden, who studied Chicago's ERAP from 1964
/
through 1965, interracial organizing was difficult because there 
was no immediate successful model of racial unity as a means to 
achieving economic progress.(40)
Another difficulty in organizing the poor was that many 
residents had just moved into poor communities or were transients. 
Therefore, it was unlikely for such people (many from Appalachia) 
to feel a part of the community. Residents might ask why they 
should bother working to get a recreation center if one might be 
moving out at any time to find available or better work.(41)
Wini Breines1s study of ERAP in The Great Refusal:
Community Organization in the New Left. 19 62-1968. accused the 
traditional political inactivity of the poor for failing to make 
ERAP a success. Citing Frances Fox-Piven and Richard Cloward's 
Poor People Movements, she claimed that building an organization 
for poor people was not seen as useful to many neighborhoods since, 
previously, the poor had achieved more (from their perspective) 
through violence than through legal and political means.(42) 
Inherent problems of the poor were compounded by the 
students' (all in their twenties) inexperience of living in a 
ghetto while trying to relate with the poor and their needs. 
Looking back at ERAP, Hayden revealed that "None of my reading or 
class work prepared me for the economic realities or . . . the real
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operations of political machines.1 (43) The inexperience of the 
students also made it difficult for them to mobilize the poor as an 
active force. Students as well as community residents were 
generally unable to penetrate local and national governmental 
structures. The SDS was forced to realize that governmental 
bureaucracy was too powerful and removed from its citizens to 
generate any comprehensive reforms.(44)
It can also be argued that the participatory democracy 
approach actually hindered ERAP's success. The anti-bureaucratic 
perspective of the students transferred onto the poor prevented 
a strong leadership from emerging in individual chapters.(45)
Thus, one reason for the failures of JOIN could have been that it 
tried to make everyone a leader. Everyone in the community union 
wanted to direct the project. Since everyone was a leader, it was 
difficult to build a consensus on the issues. Students as well as 
neighborhood residents were emotionally and physically exhausted 
from trying to get everyone to agree on a strategy or goal.(46) 
The uncertainty as to whether ERAP should emphasize dealing 
with poverty or experimenting with participatory democracy left 
many students confused as to their own purpose for working in ERAP. 
Such a situation contributed to the demoralization of students who 
tried often unsuccessfully to interest residents in ERAP. Todd 
Gitlin recalled, "I hated knocking on doors trying to entice people 
into an organization difficult to explain."(47)
Organizing was also difficult because students idealized the 
lower-class 1s self-awareness and power potential. Not only did
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condescending attempts to create leadership produce guilt among 
students, who felt they were manipulating the poor, but the lack of 
substantial results shattered unrealistic expectations, damaging 
ERAP's morale.(48)
Morale was also affected by the poor's indifference toward 
forming community unions. ERAP's newsletters reported low 
attendance at ERAP meetings and at demonstrations. In areas where 
ERAP was supposedly building a strong power base, the lack of 
interest in rallies and protests was particularly disillusioning. 
In fall 1964, only two people showed up for an "urban renewal" 
rally in Chester where only a year before the community staged a 
successful protest and boycott. Also, in 1964, the Chicago JOIN 
project reported attendances as low as six people at its weekly 
community union meetings. But in the previous fall, Joe Chabot 
claimed that everyday twenty-five people entered the JOIN office to 
discuss problems of welfare and employment.(49)
In his autobiography, Reunion: A Memoir. Hayden stressed the
marginal interest of the poor and how that had a negative impact on 
ERAP’s enthusiasm. One would have to visit 150 residences in order 
to get ten people to a community meeting. Although Hayden recalled 
his work in Newark as a minor success, it could never be considered 
a model of participatory democracy since most of the community was 
not involved.(50) Wini Breines, in The Great Refusal. claimed that 
one basic reason the poor were uninterested was that they 
understood their lack of power more than the students. Unless 
the poor had some political leverage (a significant number of
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registered voters or money), no one in government would listen to 
them. As Harrington wrote in The Other America, citing John 
Kenneth Galbraith, the current poor was the first group of lower 
classes that the politicians could leave alone and be elected to 
office. (51) Thus, without any power or material resources to play 
the games of politics, the poor found no reason to organize.
What also contributed to the students' lack of zeal in ERAP 
were the living conditions to which the middle-class students 
subjected themselves. Student volunteers at ERAP chapters lived, 
ate, and slept together in the same residence. Such strains on 
privacy were compounded by near conditions of malnutrition. One 
wonders how long one NCUP member could attest that each member was 
"eating quite well for 70 cents a day."(52)
Another problem with the ERAP organization was that students 
were only available for two or three months in the summer. In such 
a short time span, it was difficult to commit oneself to a 
particular community and bring about results. ERAP reported that 
only one-third of its membership stayed on after the summer.
But, the JOIN organizers believed that individuals would have to 
devote two to five whole years to the project in order to have an 
impact on a community.(53)
ERAP's enthusiasm was also hindered by attacks by local police 
and community members. Although neighborhood residents rarely 
physically attacked ERAP workers, ERAP was often harassed by the 
police and landlords. In 1964, an ERAP Newsletter reported that 
Hayden was arrested in Newark for battery of a female landlord who
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was the object of a rent strike. He was released when the landlord 
could not identify the accused.(54) Also in that same fall, on 
October 6, an ERAP organizer in Hazard, Kentucky reported that 
shots had been fired at the office of ERAP's chapter--Appalachian 
Committee for Full Employment. (55) On June 24, 1965, the Chicago 
vice-squad arrested twelve members of JOIN and one juvenile staying 
in their apartment. Two were charged with having a disorderly 
house, possession of.illicit drugs, and contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor. Ten were charged with disorderly conduct 
and being inmates of a disorderly house. The minor was sent to 
juvenile delinquency authorities. According to the ERAP Newsletter 
which reported the incident, the police had no search warrant and 
the barbiturates found had been planted by the police. Although 
all charges were dropped for insufficient evidence, the arrest was 
published in major papers like the Chicago Daily News, giving JOIN 
an unhealthy reputation among the community. Such acts against 
chapters damaged ERAP's reputation as well as its members' 
morale.(56)
Another cause of the eventual termination of ERAP was the 
emerging opposition to the Vietnam War. Not only did the war and 
the draft affect students more immediately than inner city poverty, 
but the goal of ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam was more clear. 
Students were drawn to the Vietnam issue also because it was less 
experimental. Students knew what had to be done and how to 
approach it by looking to elder pacifists like A.J. Muste and Dave 
Dellinger and to previous anti-war movements in the United
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States.. (57)
The decline of ERAP was accelerated in March 1965 by the 
dissolution of the National Office. From then on ERAP chapters 
operated independently of the ultimate direction of the SDS. The 
SDS withdrew its support of ERAP because of its preoccupation with 
Vietnam and because the newer members of the SDS gaining control of 
the SDS wanted to bring the SDS back to the campuses. ERAP 
organizers also agreed that .a centralized office had impeded the 
independence needed to create programs designed for particular 
chapters. ERAP organizers also may have believed that the 
centralized organization made the poor feel less powerful, since 
(like the local government) ERAP chapters were only a small part of 
a remote organization.(58)
However, not all ERAP organizers agreed on the dissolution.
To some, decentralization meant that each chapter would have to 
take on national functions, such as recruiting student members, 
funding projects, and providing resources needed to research and 
mobilize the needs of the community. These functions were 
previously reserved by the ERAP National Office in Ann Arbor. ERAP 
chapters also lost their identification as part of a national 
organization, consequently forcing all projects to concentrate on 
local and immediate reforms. Because each project now bore a 
greater responsibility and sought fewer radical goals than it 
had only a year or two earlier, membership and morale dwindled. As 
a consequence of the decentralization of ERAP and the general 
disillusionment of the program, individual chapters voluntarily
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shut down, the Chicago JOIN project was the last to close, ceasing 
operations in February 1968.(59)
Although ERAP itself was a failure, it had some long-term 
effects on cities and the student movement. Besides helping to 
provoke a self-awareness of their potential political power, ERAP 
helped to build a power base of poor and black inner city eligible 
voters whom officials would have to recognize in order to be 
elected. For .example, Kirkpatrick Sale in SDS attributed the 
election of Newark's Mayor Kenneth Gibson in 1970 to the 
mobilization of blacks by NCUP. (60.):: ERAP introduced radicalism not 
only to local residents, but to ERAP students as well. After 
projects folded, several members joined local anti-poverty, anti­
gang organizations and the Great Society's VISTA (Volunteers In 
Service To America).(61) ERAP also helped to popularize the SDS 
and increase its membership through its widespread national 
operations. After ERAP, the anti-bureaucratic radicalism of ERAP 
members was transferred to inciting confrontations with the 
university power structure and the military-industrial complex. (62) 
The failure of ERAP marked the last time the New Left 
would cooperate with postwar state liberalism. ERAP organizers 
became frustrated by their attempts at testing the limits of 
American pluralism. Although the SDS hardly expected the Johnson 
administration to respond to the needs of the poor articulated by 
ERAP, the actual lack of interest by the liberals revealed the 
empty promises of the "Great Society." Thus after ERAP, the SDS 
was more resolute in fulfilling the goals of The Port Huron
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Statement and America and the New Era which questioned the 
validity of postwar state sponsored liberalism. (63)
The overall execution of ERAP's strategies, and goals 
also indicated the active assertion of the New Left as an 
organization distinct from the Old Left. By examining the 
philosophy and purpose of ERAP, differences between the Old Left 
and New Left are revealed. This aspect of ERAP will be explored 
in-depth in the following chapter.
ERAP was the first active project which the SDS operated 
completely by itself. Because it was its first project, there was 
much optimism. This optimism was fueled in part by the idealism of 
the early sixties, as well as by The Port Huron Statement and 
America and the New Era. Consequently, ERAP attempted to achieve 
unrealistic goals. Even though ERAP; is historically viewed as a 
failure, the program can also be perceived as a success in the 
broader context of the SDS and the New Left. ERAP generated 
radicalism in the SDS and, as we shall see in the next chapter, it 
helped create an independent and thus "New" Left.
CHAPTER III
ELEMENTS OF THE OLD LEFT REJECTED BY ERAP
ERAP's purposes and strategies expressed the differences 
between the SDS and the LID. Although the SDS did not purposely 
use ERAP to act as a vehicle to separate itself from the LID, 
it can certainly be argued that ERAP's strategies, goals, and 
organization displayed a growing chasm between the parent 
organization and its offspring. As ERAP continued on a 
comprehensive level up to mid-196.5, it became more and more 
apparent that the SDS was essentially embarking on an independent 
course.
The most obvious difference between the LID and the SDS 
exhibited by ERAP concerned the educative and active approaches to 
facilitating social change. When ERAP began, many SDS members 
favored direct activism over the LID's educative tactic. But the 
LID's focus on educating the public and the Democratic party on 
social issues and possible solutions was still shared by the 
original early SDS president and 1963 director of ERAP, A1 Haber.
Haber's interest in using the SDS as an educative 
organization was influenced (if not reinforced) by his 1961 
conflict with the LID over his plan to send out a civil rights 
newsletter, perceived by the LID as a tactic to convert the SDS
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into an active organization. Another interpretation is that Haber 
sincerely wanted to contain the SDS's activity and prevent it from 
becoming a high-profiled force on the Left. Haber hoped that the 
SDS would become an educating agent to radicalize students who 
would continue their liberal and, to a lesser extent, radical 
politics when they graduated and entered their professions. In 
opposition to Haber, Tom Hayden perceived the SDS as a potentially 
active and radical organization which should participate directly 
in American politics. Whether ERAP was to adopt an educative 
strategy or a program which emphasized direct action was determined 
at the December 1963 National Conference.
Haber favored an organization which would focus its efforts on 
educating and radicalizing university students. At the December 
Conference, Haber argued his anti-activist position with Hayden who 
represented those favoring a participative approach. Overall, 
Haber claimed that an activist program could not depend on 
necessary widespread support from a coalition of blacks, labor, and 
liberals. According to Haber, this was because the American Left 
at that time was small and insignificant. Haber predicted that 
ERAP could eventually become an active organization and help build 
a strong national Left only after it had educated students, 
researched community economic problems, and developed a plan to 
mobilize individual neighborhoods.(1) Haber also believed that 
the limited resources of the SDS hindered ERAP's ability to fulfill 
a wide range of goals which included student participation in 
community unions. ERAP would have to "prioritize" its work.
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According to Haber, The SDS's resources could be most productive if 
ERAP worked at reinforcing the Left and recruited those likely to 
be interested in ERAP.
Haber believed that it would be better in the long term to 
build a foundation of student radicals and then radicalize the 
general public. He recommended that the ERAP National Office in 
Ann Arbor provide educational materials and program orientation for 
local chapters, explore areas in need of new ERAP chapters, recruit 
new members, sponsor conferences on poverty, and publish research 
papers on poverty. Haber felt that ERAP's relationship with the 
SDS should be to recruit people to the SDS and aid non-SDS groups 
doing work supported by the SDS. ERAP could help the SDS 
reactivate the American Left by building a relationship with local 
labor and civil rights groups, and by adopting the SDS's mode of 
participatory democracy and have such a system serve as a model for 
community union meetings.(2)
Hayden, however, argued that the urgency of the depressed 
condition of the poor made it necessary for students to participate 
in and facilitate direct action movements within urban communities. 
Hayden also justified the pro-activist stance by invoking America 
and the New Era (approved by both Hayden and Haber). The 1963 
document stated that the SDS was to take an active role in being 
one of many agencies of social change. This "new insurgency" of 
the SDS was to force the breakdown of "mainstream institutions." (3) 
Hayden considered Haber's plan too dependent on the current 
political structures, namely state sponsored liberalism. Hayden
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claimed that if ERAP operated outside the bounds of existing 
political institutions, co-optation by liberals would be thwarted. 
Radicalism would also keep ERAP from becoming an organization 
advocating only limited and token (liberal) reforms. Yet, 
according to Haber, Hayden's vision of an active ERAP lacked a 
long-term perspective as well as a clear program. But, Hayden 
claimed that if the program were to take a radical position from 
the beginning, a "revolutionary trajectory" would be created. 
"Tokenism" would be staved off by an autopilot-type project which 
would constantly progress and generate other reform movements.(4) 
In an SDS Bulletin essay, published March 1964, Haber 
presented his interpretation of America and the New Era to justify 
his position. Haber also perceived his plan for ERAP to be in 
accordance with America and the New Era which declared that the 
research and development of a clear-cut plan was to precede any 
mass action. Haber was very concerned that before any direct 
action be executed, an organized plan and defined set of goals 
be developed. He stated in his March 1964 reply to Todd Gitlin's 
"President's Report," "Action is not radical because its form is 
different or gutsy. It is radical because goals and perspectives 
are shared by its participants."(5)
The result of the 1963 National Conference's "Haber versus 
Hayden" debate was a twenty to six vote in favor of Hayden. The 
December conference also elected Rennie Davis as new director of 
ERAP. Thus, ERAP embarked on a course which emphasized direct 
action and radical activity in poor communities, facilitated by
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students recruited by the SDS.(6) Gitlin attempted to reconcile 
the two approaches in his April 1964 "President's Report." Gitlin 
argued that since the federal government recognized poverty as a 
major national issue, expressed by President Lyndon Johnson's 
announcement of his War on Poverty, ERAP must directly participate 
in Community Action Projects in order to press for domestic reforms 
and to test the liberals' actual interest in eradicating poverty. 
Yet, Gitlin also agreed with Haber's position that the SDS should 
consider the concept of generating radicalism among professionals. 
However, Gitlin reminded his readers that not all those involved in 
the SDS wished to pursue professional careers. There were students 
and ex-students who chose to continue to work indefinitely in the 
areas of social and political reform. Thus, Gitlin argued that the 
SDS should concentrate most of its resources on the needs of the 
general society.(7) ERAP assumed a program obviously stressing 
action over education and research; the idea of radical professions 
was never strongly considered and was buried, along with ERAP, by 
1965 as a consequence of the Vietnam issue.
Hayden's insistence on ERAP as an activist organization was 
not only contrary to Haber's opinion, but to the LID's as well. By 
becoming an active political participant, however, the SDS had 
actually moved closer to the strategies of the LID and the SLID of 
the 1930s. Yet, in the era of postwar liberalism and in the wake 
of McCarthyism, the LID hesitated to rock the boat. The LID elders 
were especially alarmed by the thought of an activist left-wing 
movement related to the LID and led by inexperienced students.
48
Regardless of the concerns of the LID, the SDS's direct action 
approach adopted by ERAP was applied to other movements such as 
Vietnam. By using direct action strategies, the SDS became an 
essential force on the Left, causing the SDS to perceive itself 
independent of other leftist organizations, namely the LID.
Another difference between the SDS and the LID exposed by ERAP 
concerned the Old Left and New Left's relationship and interest in 
cooperating with liberalism. The LID had accepted state liberalism 
as an agency for social change and used it as a channel to push for 
domestic reform. The SDS, however, was wary of liberalism. In its 
Port Huron Statement, it criticized the Democratic party (the 
majority party in power) which represented, government sponsored 
liberalism. The Port Huron Statement criticized the Party for not 
going far enough in anti-poverty and civil rights reforms. At this 
time, the SDS felt that such reforms could be enhanced if the 
Democrats were prodded by private citizens and were able to purge 
the Party of Dixiecrats. However, in 1963, America and the New Era 
displayed a growing distrust of liberalism and cooperation with the 
Democratic party. The SDS doubted the liberal establishment's 
concern for social reform. Cold War defense spending especially 
had usurped necessary resources for welfare projects. The Cold War 
had also helped create a government bureaucracy which had alienated 
itself from the public. The liberal bureaucracy's main interest 
was not in reform, but in preserving itself. By offering top-down 
welfare policies, the government had become more powerful and 
removed from the people. Fundamental reforms facilitating
49
political participation and responding to the actual needs of the 
people had not been enacted. The SDS did not consider such issue- 
specific reforms as honest approaches to social problems. Such 
legislation was neither long term nor intended to make any 
comprehensive changes in the political and social structures.(8) 
America and the New Era continued to rebuke the "New Frontier" 
for failing to instigate radical changes in the American economy; 
for supporting elite and private industries; and for being lax in 
encouraging racial equality, voting rights, low-income housing 
development, and integration.(9)
The SDS confronted the liberal abandonment of a socially 
radical platform by urging the creation of alliances with non- 
Establishment organizations. This would reactivate the Left and 
basic reforms outlined in the in The Port Huron Statement could be 
attained (The eventual organization which would lead the New Left 
suggested by America and the New Era would be the SDS through its 
ERAP).(10)
The LID was obviously disturbed by the SDS1s position on 
liberalism. The LID had followed Norman Thomas's suggestion that 
the League attempt to achieve social changes by working within the 
bi-party system. Following The Port Huron Statement. Michael 
Harrington reminded the SDS that "American liberalism for all of 
its flaws, was the mass left of the society and that radicals had 
to speak positive in it . . .  " and then he hoped, the current 
liberals would shift to the Left.(11) The LID was also concerned 
with the outright effrontery of the SDS whose leaders criticized
50
the Old Left in America and the New Era one year after Port Huron. 
The SDS disparaged the LID's sell-out to postwar liberalism, 
stating that the (liberal) Left had become "a style of politics 
which emphasizes cocktail parties and reforms rather than protest 
marches . . . "(12) ERAP's approach of working outside existing
political structures represented the rejection of the LID’s tactic 
of forming alliances with liberals and ultimately proved in clear 
view to the SDS that liberalism was a failure and useless in 
generating social reform.
ERAP actively expressed its disapproval of liberalism also by 
its advocacy of participatory democracy. Unlike the state 
sponsored top-down reforms of presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the 
SDS planned to empower communities and have the recipients 
themselves decide on reforms and programs.(13) The bottom-up 
approach was best displayed by the NCUP block organizations which 
successfully petitioned for a community-based service center. The 
granting of more political power to the poor was also represented 
by the election of a slate of local NCUP members to the Clinton 
Hill area poverty board.
The JOIN community union consciously worked to give 
residents more power in the organization's operations by eventually 
insisting that local residents become revolving chairmen of JOIN. 
In Richard Rothstein's (Chicago ERAP organizer) "A Short History of 
ERAP, 1 he described ERAP as an organization in which its "founders 
define tasks in terms of how they can largely give away power." (14) 
But Michael Harrington, an authority on the "other America"
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and principal liaison between the SDS and the LID at this time, 
criticized ERAP's attempts at empowerment. Harrington claimed in 
a New Republic article February 1966 ("The Mystical Militants") 
that the poor were too disorganized and inarticulate and it was 
hopeless to demand reforms without cooperating with the liberal 
establishment.(15)
Because of the failures of many ERAP chapters and programs, 
the SDS eventually had to agree that the poor were too 
disorganized. Yet, the SDS became more resolute in its position; 
ERAP's unsuccessful encounters with state bureaucracy and 
disappointment with President Johnson's lack of response to 
Community Action Projects (which he endorsed) only reinforced the 
SDS's negative opinion of liberalism. Johnson indicated that the 
federal government would be sympathetic to demands made by 
community groups, rather than by city or federal leaders. He 
justified the Community Action Project aspect of the War on 
Poverty, stating "these are not plans prepared in Washington 
and imposed upon by hundreds of different situations. They are 
based on the fact that local citizens best understand their 
problems and best know how to deal with those problems."(16) 
However, ERAP soon learned that city officials who had no 
relationship with the poor designed programs and allocated anti- 
poverty funds. According to the SDS, Chicago's JOIN, for example, 
could not seize Mayor Daley's control of War on Poverty funds and 
was never represented on Daley's commission to administer such 
grants, despite picketing and mailing campaigns to state
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representatives in Springfield.(17)
The SDS and its ERAP were disenchanted by the liberal 
establishment's approach to poverty. Although ERAP praised Johnson 
for programs in education, job training, and national service 
corps, and for bringing the issue of poverty to the fore, it was 
also greatly disappointed. Not only did the SDS claim that 
the Johnson administration failed to appropriate sufficient funds, 
but was also remiss in attacking poverty at its base. According to 
the SDS, federal government incentives for full production, 
requiring a massive workforce, were necessary and industries which 
were most apt to make use of automation (such as defense) should be 
discouraged because they scaled down job availability.(18)
The question of forming an alliance with liberals further 
helped widen the gap between the LID and the SDS. The SDS not 
only feared being co-opted by (i.e., deactivated by) liberals, as 
was the LID, but also found liberalism to be ineffective in dealing 
with such difficult and vital issues as poverty. Such differences 
in the Left's relationship with the liberal state made separation 
not only inevitable, but necessary. Such a break was required if 
the SDS was to carry out its agenda in The Port Huron Statement.
The third difference between the LID and the SDS which ERAP 
disclosed regarded organizational procedures. The SDS backed away 
from the centralized approach in the organization of ERAP. ERAP 
headquarters were originally located in Ann Arbor, but the office 
was eliminated when ERAP chapters became independent in 1965. 
Although the decentralization helped accelerate the downfall of
53
ERAP, such procedure did represent a different organizational 
method within the Left. Whereas the LID held tight control over 
the actions of the SDS (especially after the Port Huron conflict), 
the SDS1s ERAP experimented with less control and focused on 
empowering its individual chapters.
By mid-1964, members of the SDS and of ERAP chapters began to 
openly question the centralized authority of ERAP. Paul Potter, 
president of the SDS from 1964 to 1965, called for more empowerment 
of ERAP chapters. In the July 1964 SDS Bulletin, he urged members 
of ERAP chapters to formulate policies independent of the central 
office's guidance. Members in each ERAP chapter were encouraged to 
discuss among themselves what actions and reforms were necessary 
for their communities.(19) The justification for decentralization 
was best expressed by Carol McEldowney, an ERAP organizer in 
Cleveland. Like Potter, she was concerned that ERAP and the SDS' s 
democratic goals were jeopardized by having ultimate organization 
power situated in one location. McEldowney opined that the 
immediate danger of a centralized organization had made the poor 
feel more powerless since, like local and federal government 
leaders, ERAP chapters were only part of larger organization.(20)
What further precipitated the decentralization of ERAP was the 
Vietnam issue with which the SDS began to concern itself by late 
1964 and early 1965. SDS National Secretary C. Clark Kissinger 
foresaw Vietnam as a major issue and claimed that mass student 
involvement would be necessary to protest U.S. intervention. By 
focusing its attention on the Vietnam War and the draft, old guard
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SDS members, who had not committed themselves to the ERAP 
experiment, and younger and newer SDS members who were attracted to 
the organization by its April 17, 1965 Vietnam War demonstration, 
pushed ERAP off the center of the agenda. ERAP was now perceived 
as a non-radical hobby horse of original SDS leaders such as Rennie 
Davis, Todd Gitlin, and Carl Wittman. The SDS thus sacrificed ERAP 
in March 1965, in favor of protesting the war, forcing ERAP 
chapters to become independent as well as self-sufficient.(21)
There were many reasons for decentralization. ERAP granted 
more authority to its chapters initially for experimental 
democratic purposes and to aid their work in empowering local 
residents. By Spring 1965, however, the final decision to let ERAP 
become independent of a central office and of the SDS was made due 
to the prioritization of resources in protesting U.S. intervention 
in Vietnam and the desires of the new generation of SDSers who 
considered the SDS to be nothing more than an antiwar group. 
However, according to the views of Potter and McEldowney, even if 
the Vietnam issue had not occupied the SDS1s main concern, it is 
likely that ERAP would still have been decentralized. The SDS and 
ERAP were intent on empowering its chapters. The act of granting 
a high degree of freedom to a sub-organization represented a 
rejection of the LID's authoritarian control over its projects 
and subordinates. Thus, the SDS and ERAP's policy of 
decentralization proved once more that the LID and the SDS had 
basically become two separate entities.
ERAP demonstrated the growing rift between the SDS and the LID
which had been growing since 1961. By rejecting the LID's position 
on activism, liberalism, and organization, the SDS had shown it was 
departing from its identification with the Old Left. Distancing 
itself from the Old Left was necessary in order to build a revived 
American Left. Although it is obvious that The Port Huron 
Statement and America and the New Era first expressed the SDS1s 
disaffection with the LID, ERAP's significance is that it was a 
tangible and active program with strategies and purposes opposed to 
the principles of the Old Left.
CONCLUSION
When ERAP was created, it was to mobilize the poor in northern 
American cities. The program originally followed the principles of 
the LID by emphasizing research and informing students of the 
circumstances and issues regarding poverty. From 1964 to ERAP's 
complete demise in 1967, however, the program veered from the 
guidelines of its parent organization by depending on the direct 
participation of students. ERAP also rejected the LID's amicable 
relationship and compromise with the state liberalism of the
Democratic party. Finally, ERAP variated from the LID by
\
decentralizing the organization between ERAP and the SDS and 
between ERAP and its chapters and by infusing ERAP sponsored 
community unions with the power to direct their own programs. 
Although it cannot be proven that members of the SDS and ERAP 
designed the strategies and goals of ERAP with the purpose in mind 
to actively declare its independence from the LID, it can be argued 
persuasively that ERAP did serve as an agent which demonstrated 
that the LID and the SDS were becoming two separate divisions on 
the Left.
The immediate result of ERAP acting as an instrument 
representing Old Left and New Left differences was the LID-SDS 
breakup in fall 1965. ERAP's display of differences between the
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two organizations had magnified the already tense relationship 
created by the Port Huron confrontation. ERAP had shown the LID 
that the SDS was now an organization unto itself with no direct 
ties to other leftist groups. This independence encouraged the SDS 
to become more militant and outspoken. The SDS was thus 
uninhibited from taking a stand against U.S. cooperation with South 
African apartheid and American involvement in Vietnam. By freeing 
itself from the leadership of the LID, the SDS was enabled to 
organize protests on issues of which the LID and the SDS did not 
agree.
In April 1965, the SDS organized the March on Washington 
against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The march was not supported 
by the LID. In fact, the League issued a message to the press the 
day before the inarch, disclaiming collusion with the participants. 
The LID was particularly disturbed by the SDS1s cooperation with 
the Maoist Progressive Labor Party in organizing the event.(1)
Regardless of the lack of support from its affiliate, the SDS 
proceeded with the protest which drew 20,000 to 25,000 
participants. Because of the large turnout, the media naturally 
reported the demonstration. Such national coverage informed 
several students of the existence of the SDS who subsequently 
became SDS members. (2) This massive increase was welcomed by the 
SDS, according to Todd Gitlin in The Whole World is Watching: Mass
Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. In late 1964 and 
early 1965, the SDS under National Secretary C. Clark Kissinger 
intended to convert the SDS from a small personalized organization
into a mass movement in order to confront effectively U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam and the draft. The LID was disappointed 
with the increase in membership and was concerned that such a wide 
interest in the SDS would attract radical and undisciplined 
elements and subvert the student organization.(3) But by 1965, the 
SDS did not let the interests of the LID determine its policy 
regarding membership enlargement, association with radical 
leftists, and positions on foreign policy issues. Such freedom to 
design its own program would not have been possible without the 
independent environment generated by ERAP.(4)
The LID formally cut all ties with the SDS on October 4, 
1965.(5) Although the LID realized that the SDS had evolved into 
an organization different in philosophy, purpose, and strategy, 
the immediate cause of the split was that the SDS1s militant 
politics threatened the LID's tax-exemption status and the LID 
objected to the change in the SDS Constitution at the June 1965 
National Conference in Kewadin, Michigan. Only months after the 
SDS had worked with radical left elements like Progressive Labor 
and the DuBois Clubs in the April demonstration, the SDS struck out 
the clause in its constitution barring members of "totalitarian" 
organizations. (6) Thus, the SDS embarked on its own and faced the 
burdens and dangers which such independence entailed. Along with 
the freedom to formulate and implement its own massive anti-Vietnam 
War and anti-draft program came the responsibility of confronting 
the new generation of SDSers (with a variety of views) and 
communist organizations interested in infiltrating the SDS.
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The appearance of the new radical elements became obvious by
1967-1968. At the December 1968 National Conference in Chicago,
the Progressive Labor Party, which had been admitted to the SDS in
1966, demanded that the SDS be the vanguard party of a working
class socialist movement.(7) The other two factions which had
emerged by 1968, the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) and the
Weathermen, disagreed with Progressive Labor's plan. RYM called
on students to infiltrate the workforce and work beside their
blue-collar counterparts to create a popular revolution. The
Weathermen discounted chances for success of a working class
revolution and supported isolated (violent) acts protesting the
Establishment which endorsed imperialism, racism, and sexism.(8)
*
The SDS had shifted its strategy from a reformist approach to one 
in favor of radical governmental change. Without the Old Left 
(LID) to harness the SDS1 s moderate character, the SDS was allowed 
to descend into a radical and popularly unattractive organization.
Because of the differences between Progressive Labor and RYM 
and the Weathermen, the SDS splintered into two factions at the 
December 1968 National Conference. In early 1969, RYM and the 
Weathermen split over their opposing revolutionary strategies and 
goals. By mid-1969, the Weathermen had gone underground and RYM 
had dissolved.(9) The disintegration of the SDS was partly caused 
by its gradual and permanent cessation of a direct relationship 
with the LID. Because of its sudden rise in popularity with 
radical elements and preoccupation with Vietnam, the SDS was never 
able to prepare and carry out a formal ideology which might have
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been possible had the SDS remained connected to the LID. The 
demise of the SDS was also caused by the lack of a steady and firm 
organizational base. The annual elections of new officers, 
the multitude of National Conferences, and various ideas brought in 
from the new members since 1965 prevented the SDS from providing 
itself with a solid definition of what type of organization it 
would be and shield itself from ideas different from The Port Huron 
Statement. But, it was still vital for the SDS to separate itself 
from the LID in order to have the national attention which it 
received. In order to build a newly defined and revived American 
Left, the SDS had to remove all vestiges of the Old Left.
Todd Gitlin indicated in The Whole World is Watching that the 
SDS considered itself the "New Left" by 1963, the year ERAP began. 
The irony is that, at this time, the SDS still belonged to the Old 
Left, the LID. Perhaps, by self-fulfilling prophecy, the SDS was 
determined to become a truly "New Left." This was made possible by 
the strategies, goals, and purposes of ERAP which opposed the LID 
principles. Thus, in the context of the LID-SDS conflict, ERAP was 
an expression of the SDS1s rejection of the Old Left. ERAP was a 
link in the gradual division between the SDS and the LID, wedged 
between The Port Huron Statement and the 1965 Kewadin Conference. 
ERAP created a sense of independence and self-assertion necessary 
for the SDS to create a new and active Left, fully realized by 
1965.
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